Mediawatch's review [1] of coverage of the relationship between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or 'mad cow disease') and human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) coincided with disclosure of 10 new, suspicious CJD cases in the UK. The people affected were much younger than normal for CJD and had significantly different pathology. The UK Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) advised the government that the most likely -but by no means certainexplanation was exposure to the agent responsible for BSE. Thought to be a prion, the agent probably first affected cows when their feedstuffs contained tissues from sheep with scrapie, before such feedstuffs were banned in 1989.
The intense furore that followed the SEAC's announcement showed some sections of the media, particularly television, at their worst. As before, however, many print journalists tackled a complex issue with considerable skill. And, again, politicians surpassed themselves in failing to make the all-important distinction between expert advice and their own responsibilities to public health and the agricultural industry.
On the credit side, broadsheet newspapers allocated many pages to meticulous dissections of what is, and is not, known about the two (or three?) diseases. On 21 March, for example, the Independent carried (in addition to an editorial, a political commentary and readers' letters) 14 pieces on different aspects of the story -a total of some 9 000 words. All the articles were written against pressing deadlines the previous day, and covered, inter alia, the SEAC's findings and the government's response, evidence for the new type of CJD, descriptions of individual patients, epidemiology of CJD and BSE, European reactions and the positions of organizations representing farmers, consumers and the food industry. Embedded within such extensive reportage were careful explanations of several levels of uncertainty in the evidence, and discussions of risk assessment. Scientists prone to criticise the media might ponder the contrast between an accomplishment of this sort and the more leisurely task of honing a research paper over many weeks.
The tabloid press -often unjustly maligned by those who confuse simplicity with inaccuracyperformed less creditably on this occasion. Consider the Daily Mirror of 21 March. Under the headline "THE PROOF" and a photograph of a seriously ill woman thought to be one of the 10 new cases of CJD/BSE, the paper announced unambiguously: "Mad Cow Disease killed mum Michelle Bowen. It may kill her son Tony and now experts say it could kill 500 000 of YOU."
The furore over BSE/CJD showed some of the media at their worst Television programmes adopted the same approach. Presenters interviewed "victims' relatives", usually sensitively but rarely with any warning that it was impossible to draw conclusions about aetiology from such individual experiences. They then compounded the offence in two other ways. Firstly, ministers and scientists were pressed repeatedly to give more definitive answers than the evidence allowed, or to estimate the precise, quantitative risk BSE posed for the average beef-eater. "Is it one in a million or one in ten million?", TV interviewer David Frost wanted to know, as though the difference were of any practical significance. Secondly, and coupled with several assertions that scientists created the problem in the first place, there was a lamentable failure to recognize that without science we would scarcely be aware of the BSE/CJD scenario at all. As MRC statistician Sheila Gore observed [2] , the CJD surveillance unit established in Edinburgh in 1990 has been spectacularly successful -not least in discerning the 10 new cases, and their possible significance, in a population of 55 million. Yet some journalists and pundits have been keener to blame science than to praise it.
There was a predictably different line from Prime Minister John Major. On 28 March, he blamed the media and opposition politicians for whipping up a crisis. This was the same Mr Major who, five months earlier, announced: "I should make it clear that humans do not get mad cow disease". Having extrapolated far beyond the advice of the SEAC at that time, he and his ministers switched to adhering tenaciously to its necessarily qualified later verdict, and they refused to acknowledge that concrete action was needed to restore confidence at home and abroad. Others were left to underline the inadequacy of that position.
But action was required, and was eventually agreed with Britain's European Union partners, in the form of some type of cow cull. The government had moved from a sequence of obstinate assertions about the total safety of beef eating, to an angry U-turn, and had lost public confidence as a result. Such a debacle was eminently avoidable. Had successive ministers followed both the letter and spirit of their expert advice, prudent government action could have reflected genuine scientific knowledge. Instead, Mr Major and colleagues had to face a 'double whammy' of costly measures disproportionate to the actual risk and falling even lower in esteem than they were before.
